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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
n all EU countries today, lenders can access information in databases to help them assess the
creditworthiness of a credit applicant. The establishments that compile these databases are
known as credit bureaus, credit registries or credit reporting agencies. Credit bureaus gather
information on the payment history of borrowers and issue credit reports prior to the underwriting
of a loan, whether for the purpose of buying a house, a car, opening a credit line or simply
subscribing to a mobile telephone service.
In the United States, data from credit bureaus on consumer borrowing, payment behaviour and
other aspects of household finances have become the cornerstone of underwriting decisions on
consumer loans. Credit bureaus in the United States collect and store comprehensive data for over
200 million adult residents. More than 2 million credit reports are sold by credit bureaus every day.
It is widely accepted that the development of the credit bureau industry has played an essential role
in the expansion of the North American credit market.
The type and quantity of data available and the mechanisms by which this information is shared
vary greatly across EU countries. Lenders often provide information to credit bureaus voluntarily,
although in some cases, the authorities impose this disclosure via public registers. The data
collected can vary over time and between countries and usually consist of past instances of default
or payments having fallen in arrears (known as ‘negative’ information). The data can also be of a
‘positive’ nature, however, to include a customer’s outstanding liabilities, maturities and other
details about his or her credit history.
Credit bureaus are often cited as a valuable instrument in the fight against the growth of over-
indebtedness through their extensive collection and sharing of positive data. The industry, social
actors and public policy authorities, however, do not agree on the impact of the availability of
detailed financial information collected by credit bureaus. Moreover, previous statistical studies
have not found evidence correlating the collection of this type of data with lower levels of over-
indebtedness in a country. According to recent surveys, in fact, over-indebtedness occurs in most
instances as a result of a ‘life event’, e.g. the loss of a job or the break-up of a family unit due to a
divorce or the death of one of the partners – factors that cannot be predicted ex ante. In addition,
differing cultural and spending habits result in divergent attitudes towards the repayment of
contracted debts.
European society attaches great importance to the protection of the right of the individual to
privacy, and regards with suspicion the compilation and distribution of files containing personal
data. It is necessary, therefore, to negotiate a balance between the rights of the individual and the
need of lenders to have access to information on the payment history and practices of loan
applicants. Despite recent efforts at harmonisation in this area, illustrated by the so-called Data
Protection Directive, EU countries can apply more restrictive provisions, which explains why the
regulatory framework of credit bureaus varies widely across the EU.
The debate on the role of credit bureaus in today’s credit markets is not restricted to considerations
of privacy protection and over-indebtedness. Another important factor is the lack of widespread
cross-border credit, which threatens the completion of a truly single retail credit market. Accurate
risk assessment of borrowers based in countries other than that of the grantor requires efficient
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information-sharing agreements between all the credit bureaus in the European Union. The
maintenance of transparent records within a secure framework that also respects the rules on
privacy should ensure the discreet collection and processing of this information on consumers, and
facilitate access to cross-border credit for all consumers. This exchange takes place, at present,
however, only on a bilateral basis and is very limited in scope.
In light of the diversity of cultures and practices throughout the European Union and with a view to
the forthcoming update of the EU Consumer Credit Directive, it has been argued by some that
harmonisation of laws concerning data protection and the prevention of over-indebtedness
represent essential requirements for the completion of a single retail credit market. In the minds of
others, however, the existing patchwork picture is simply the temporary result of the functioning of
different national markets, and transformation will come about with the evolution of the market.
Despite their tremendous importance, surprisingly scant attention has been paid in the literature to
the role of credit bureaus in the credit markets of Europe today. Additionally, there is very little
empirical research being conducted in this field. In this report we attempt to offer a view of the
credit reporting industry in Europe, the laws by which it is governed and their impact on over-
indebtedness, the availability of credit in the economy and the completion of the Single Market.1
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Introduction
Credit bureaus collect various kinds of financial information on individuals. It is essential that
credit and finance companies have access to this information in order to assess the creditworthiness
of borrowers prior to granting them credit. Financial information is collected in all EU economies;
some credit bureaus only collect and make available information on default payments, whereas
others compile extensive files on outstanding credit and the repayment history of the individual.
An important distinction is made in the industry between negative (or black) information, which is
collected only on borrowers with a history of payment defaults and positive (or white) information
which is collected on all borrowers in the market, regardless of any previous payment incident. This
paper refers to credit bureaus in their most extensive form, both public and private and those
collecting both positive and negative information.
This paper is organised as follows. The first section presents the functioning of credit bureaus and
discusses the rationale for their existence within the credit market. The second section covers the
different approaches taken to protect private data in the EU and the US, in particular in the context
of finance and credit. The third section deals with particular issues arising in the field of credit
bureaus, such as social and public policy-makers’ views on the limits to the collection of data, the
role of exchanging information in the context of the EU market for the completion of a single
consumer credit market and the utility of credit bureaus in the fight against over-indebtedness. The
paper ends with a set of conclusions and recommendations for public policy.
1. The role of credit bureaus
When a lender first evaluates the creditworthiness of an individual, he gathers information from
two principal types of sources. The first source is the lender’s own database developed through
years of experience in the market and which is composed of past and present clients. The second
source is the information available via credit bureaus, which exchange information on the basis of
reciprocal agreements and collect information on clients for all financial institutions in the market.
The analysis of a client’s creditworthiness is completed by information obtained directly by
interviewing the applicant and the application of credit-scoring techniques. Consequently, credit
bureaus are active players in the credit market.
Good screening of applicants and risk management are vital issues for lending institutions, which
dedicate large resources to the screening of loan applicants before granting credit. Proof of this
exhaustive screening is the rather high rejection rate of leading consumer credit banks, ranging
between 15 and 20% of all applications. This meticulous screening process reduces the number of
loans not recovered to a small fraction of the total, between 1 and 2% (Khalil and Parigi, 2001).
1.1 The basics of credit bureaus
Credit registries, or credit bureaus, are databases of information on borrowers in a financial system.
The data are provided by lenders, and together with data from other sources, such as courts or tax
authorities, are managed by central banks, private companies or professional associations, which
compile all the information referring to an individual into a single file. In most cases, credit bureausAMPARO SAN JOSÉ RIESTRA
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operate on a reciprocal basis and only credit institutions supplying information to the registry can
obtain information from it.
Data from the registries are made available for a fee in the form of credit reports to credit
institutions. The credit report is a decisive factor when deciding whether or not to grant a request
for credit or a loan and for credit management purposes, such as following up the solvency of a
credit card holder. A credit bureau can issue several kinds of credit reports depending on the
information gathered (positive or negative), the purpose of the information (housing or consumer
credit) and the amount requested. In some countries, consulting credit bureaus’ files prior to the
underwriting of credit is obligatory by regulation.
Figure 1. How credit registries function
(4)
Granting/refusal of credit
Information flow
Information request
(2)
Credit bureau
(3)
Credit report
Request for credit
(1)
Credit bureaus have an important function within the credit market. They facilitate the assessment
of a borrower’s creditworthiness and act as a borrower’s disciplinary mechanism, becoming key
tools in the functioning of the credit industry, in particular for consumer credit institutions. In order
for reputation to act as an incentive within the system, the borrower has to know that his payment
record will become public knowledge: other lenders must be able to have access to information. In
general, the major lending criterion is a bank’s prior experience with the borrower, that is, the
‘reputation’ the borrower has established with the bank. If the borrower is not a client, the bank will
first check his or her record with the credit bureau to learn of the existence of any unpaid credit.
At a later stage, by applying a credit-scoring model, lenders can assess the probability of repayment
of the loan compared to the risks levels accepted by the credit institution. Overall, credit bureaus
and credit scoring facilitate better screening of applicants, and ultimately contribute to the sound
expansion of credit within the economy.
The benefits of credit bureaus to lenders and borrowers are obvious. Both parties in the relationship
have an interest in maximising the number of good credit agreements granted and refusing the bad
ones. For lenders, the optimisation of credit granted and refused is the key to ensuring the
profitability of fund management. From the perspective of borrowers, there is an interest in
obtaining access to credit in order to finance purchases; hence, the repayment of credit will ensure a
clean record on the registry and allow future borrowings from the credit market. The interest of
consumers and lenders thereby coincides. Lenders would be more willing to exchange information
in markets where the mobility and the heterogeneity of borrowers reduce their ability to assess the
creditworthiness of an individual on the basis of their own records alone. Credit institutions need to
supplement their own information with information from other lenders. Equally, the larger the
market is, the more incentive lenders will have to exchange information. It appears that lenders are
Credit
supplier
Credit
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more inclined towards information-sharing agreements when operating in segmented markets, or
where the mobility of customers is higher. In the United States for instance, where credit markets
are segmented by regulation, credit bureaus are established as local or state players (Pagano and
Jappelli, 2000). The same is true in Germany, where local entities associated with Schufa merged
later into one single national company.
Nevertheless, since banks and financial institutions are concerned with the cost of creating and
maintaining extensive records on individuals’ finance, there are limits to the exchange of
information. To ensure the quality of the information collected and exchanged in this context is also
extremely demanding.
1.2 Mastering risk: A core competitive asset of credit providers
Mastering credit risk is one of the core competencies of credit providers. The process begins when
the potential client approaches the lender and ends when the last statement is paid or, in the worst
case, when the credit is considered unrecoverable and written off following a judicial procedure or
the insolvency of the borrower. Credit bureaus are one element in this chain.
Before granting credit, financial companies carry out a thorough analysis of the borrower to
determine his or her creditworthiness. This analysis includes the application of scoring techniques,
a budgetary analysis of the applicant and a ‘green light’ from the credit experts of the lending
institution. Risk assessment is especially important for the consumer credit sector, which typically
grants a large number of small-sum credits. In this sector, profitability is only achieved by
minimising the risk while ensuring at the same time that a sizeable volume of credits is granted. It
is reported that each adult citizen in the UK and the United States is subject to a credit-scoring
process (or behavioural scoring whereby lenders decide whether to increase the level of credit to an
existing customer) at least once a month on average (ESRC, 2002).
Figure 2. Mastering risk
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
Granting Monitoring Recovery
Credit scoring, a technique introduced by American and English credit bureaus, attempts to
categorise credit applicants according to risk classes with the aim of identifying the probability of
repayment. Basically, scorecards assign a score to the applicant borrower that expresses the odds of
repayment. In most cases, the credit scoring systems are built on information from the client base of
Repayment history
Credit bureaus
Ability to repay
Budget analysis
Risk analysis
Credit scoring
Granting decision
Expert analysis
Detect early signals
of default
Follow- up of first
unpaid statements
Avoid further non-
payment incidents
Personalised
contacts with
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Avoid litigation
Amicable settlement
with rearrangement
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Last resort action
Judicial procedure
Recovery
Write off
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the financial institution itself. In certain cases, however, they are built on the basis of positive
information collected by credit bureaus.
Table 1. Risk of default according to credit scoring
Scores Probability of default*
9 0.03 to 0.07%
8 0.09 to 0.3%
7 0.3 to 1.0%
6 1.0 to 3.0%
5 2.0 to 5.0%
4 3.0 to 7.0%
3 4.5 to 10.0%
2 6.0 to 13.0%
1 7.5 to 17.0%
* Random figures for the example.
The fixed cut-off point is the level on the scale of credit scores that corresponds to a particular
credit risk, average marginal revenue and average credit loss, below which the credit product in
question would generate a financial loss. Based on the degree of risk that it is willing to accept, the
credit institution fixes the cut-off level (i.e. companies that might decide not to grant credit for
scores lower than 4 will assume a maximum risk of 7%).
Credit scoring is particularly useful to lenders with a large portfolio containing smaller-sum credits,
as in the case of financial institutions in the retail and consumer credit market. This type of lender
holds files that contain sufficient information to allow for a relatively accurate assessment of credit
risk per category of borrower, and to allocate new applicants to one of the identified categories.
Over the past three decades, credit-granting processes have undergone immense transformation,
facilitated by the development of information technologies. In turn, this technological progress has
reduced the average time and cost in making credit decisions and has improved their accuracy. The
practice of almost ‘instant credit assessment’ would have been unthinkable without such
developments. Currently, some countries rely more on automated credit-granting systems than on
the information supplied by the applicant.
Once the credit has been granted, the evolution of the debt is monitored to detect early signals of
default in order to prevent it. All financial institutions dedicate significant resources to the
settlement of problematic debts, attempting to maximise the number of debts that are settled
amicably to the benefit of both lender and borrower.
The final stage is a judicial settlement, with a court imposing the repayment and/or rearrangement
of the debt, or declaring the debtor insolvent. Judicial procedures are not the best option for lenders,
as they are both expensive and time-consuming - and do not necessarily result in recovery of the
debt.
1.3 Credit bureaus in economic literature
Information exchange and the economics of information exchange have been the subject of a large
body of academic literature, which shows that asymmetric information between borrowers and
lenders can prevent the efficient allocation of credit in a market. Academic literature has identified
asymmetric information as the defining characteristic of credit markets. These asymmetries cause
adverse selection and moral hazard. For some, asymmetric information may eventually act as a
barrier to entry (see Dell’Ariccia, 1998). Literature on credit bureaus, on the contrary, is more
recent and is concentrated in a handful of authors.CREDIT BUREAUS IN TODAY’S CREDIT MARKETS
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According to this literature, several reasons account for the existence of credit bureaus. First, they
ensure the best assessment of consumers’ creditworthiness and their ability to repay prior to the
underwriting of credit. Credit reporting thereby allows minimising the occurrence of default and
controlling the moral hazard problem, acting as a ‘borrowers disciplinary device’. Second, credit
reporting assists in eliminating or diminishing the effects of adverse selection, ensuring ‘more
credit under better conditions’. For these reasons, commercial banks or financial institutions
operating in the field attach high importance to the process of screening applicants prior to the
granting of credit. Credit bureaus are an essential part of this process. Khalil and Parigi (2001) also
show the importance of the screening procedure in relation to the large fixed recovery costs.
The adverse selection problem occurs because lower-quality borrowers, with higher credit risks, are
the ones who are the most willing to pay higher interest rates, reducing the gains to both borrowers
and lenders (Alary and Gollier, 2001). The adverse selection problem signals that when lenders
cannot distinguish good from bad borrowers, all borrowers are charged an average interest rate that
reflects their pooled experience. If this rate is higher than good borrowers deserve, it will push
some good borrowers out of the market, leading in turn to banks charging even higher rates to the
remaining borrowers. Through the sharing of information, the lender is able to distinguish bad from
good borrowers in the market.
Better access to information helps lenders measure borrower risk more accurately and to set loan
terms accordingly. Lower-risk borrowers would be offered more attractive prices, stimulating credit
demand, and fewer higher-risk borrowers would be rationed out of the market because of lenders’
inability to offer these borrowers accommodating rates (Barron and Staten, 2000).
The moral hazard problem implies that a borrower has the incentive to default unless there are
consequences for his future applications for credit. This results from the difficulty lenders have in
assessing the level of wealth borrowers will have accumulated by the date on which the debt must
be repaid, and not at the moment of application. If lenders cannot assess the borrower’s wealth, the
latter will be tempted to default on their debt. Anticipating this, creditors will raise rates, leading
eventually to the breakdown of the market (Alary and Goller, 2001).
According to Jappelli and Pagano (1999), credit bureaus play a key role as ‘borrower discipline
devices’. Every borrower knows that if he defaults, his reputation with all other potential lenders is
ruined, cutting him off from credit or making it more expensive. The reputation of the borrower is a
key factor in any assessment of his ability to repay; the information contained in a credit registry
becomes part of the borrower’s ‘reputation collateral’. Late payments or defaults reduce this
‘collateral’, providing an additional incentive for timely repayment (Miller, 2000).
Limits to information-sharing on the financial history of borrowers exist namely because of credit
institutions’ fear of competition. This may be applied in the case of positive data, since all financial
institutions agree to the exchange of negative information. By supplying information to credit
bureaus, although they lose exclusivity of data, lenders ultimately gain for they are better able to
distinguish the good borrowers from the bad ones. In a market with perfect information, where
lenders are able to predict with certainty the repayment behaviour of borrowers, they would
compete to attract good borrowers by offering better loan conditions (Jappelli and Pagano, 1999).
2. Credit bureaus in Europe
The cultural differences of European countries affect the typology of the existing credit bureaus.
European countries not only have different traditions, but also specific laws regulating this issue.
National markets also differ, with most of the countries having one large credit bureau dominating
the market, as in the case of Germany, Finland, Ireland, France or Sweden, while in the UK and
Italy, two or three companies share most of the market. In addition, public and private credit
bureaus co-exist in certain markets, such as in the case of Belgium.AMPARO SAN JOSÉ RIESTRA
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Furthermore, information collected by credit bureaus is regulated, ranging from only black
information on default payers, to varying degrees of comprehensive American-style information on
all individuals. The development of credit bureaus in Europe is uneven; countries such as Sweden
and the UK have very comprehensive information in their credit bureaus, whereas strict privacy
regulations have held back the establishment of private credit bureaus in France.
2.1 Public versus private credit bureaus
Credit bureaus in Europe are in most cases privately owned, independent companies, whose
shareholders are banks and financial firms. In some cases, however, they are owned by
associations, as in the case of the Belgian UPC, which is owned by the Professional Union of
Credit providers.
Some public credit bureaus in Europe have been established to monitor the development of credit
to individuals in the economy and the levels of indebtedness and over-indebtedness. Central banks
or supervisory authorities mostly operate public credit registries, except in Finland where they are
contracted out to a private company. Access is only granted to authorised central bank staff and to
the reporting financial institutions. Despite common characteristics, public registries in Europe
differ from country to country and seem to have developed independently without consideration to
previous experiences in other countries.
Public registries may collect only negative information, as in the case of Denmark and France, but
also credit exposure of borrowers, as is the case of the registry held by the Central Bank of Spain.
Belgium has recently passed a law to allow for the establishment of positive credit bureaus; the
register of the central bank will therefore be converted into a positive central office. Financial
institutions are legally required to report to public registries. The information collected is available
on a reciprocal basis to institutions contributing information to the registry.
The experience of Belgium shows that competition (one public and one private registry in
Belgium) has brought benefits to the users. Perhaps forced by the lower prices of the UPC (Union
Professionnelle du Crédit), the registry of the National Bank of Belgium has halved its prices since
its inception, although they are still four to five times higher than those offered by the private
registry. Consultation of the public registry for retail credit is compulsory prior to the underwriting
of credit. This compulsory consultation might break the competitive balance between private and
public credit bureaus and exacerbate the monopolistic character of the industry.
In practice, financial institutions in Belgium first consult UPC files and only when there is no
negative record on the consumer in those files will the financial institution consult the public
registry. (UPC receives around 10 million consultations per year, whereas the public central
receives less than five million.) In the case of credit for non-private purposes, where consultation to
the central bank registry is not compulsory, financial institutions prefer to consult the UPC. It
seems that private and public registries however, do not have differential effects on credit market
performance, and are therefore substitutes.
1
2.2 Information collected by credit bureaus
Credit bureaus are subject to the law of the land in which they operate, which results in some of
them sharing certain characteristics while being unique in other respects. For instance, legislation in
almost all countries establishes the type of information, the maximum length of time that such
information can be stored on an individual’s credit history, regulates the right of access to the
information recorded and makes provisions for correcting errors or communicating one’s inclusion
in a registry.
                                                
1 See Jappelli and Pagano (1999).CREDIT BUREAUS IN TODAY’S CREDIT MARKETS
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Credit bureaus collecting negative or ‘black’ (B) information only gather data on subjects that have
previously defaulted on payments (delinquencies, charge-offs, bankruptcies, etc.). By contrast,
positive or ‘white’ (W) information contains other elements of the financial standing of the
individual that would allow for a more precise assessment of his or her ability to repay, such as
accounts currently open, balances or credit limits. Positive reporting is based on the assumption that
the analyses of today’s indebtedness indicate tomorrow’s solvability, whereas negative reporting
considers that defaults and difficulties are the most relevant indicators with which to predict future
insolvency (Table 2).
Table 2. Types of information and ownership of credit bureaus in Europe
Country State- owned
Consortium of credit
providers and
associations
Private company
owned by financial
institutions
Private company
not owned by
financial institutions
Austria X (B+W)
Belgium X (B) X (B)
Denmark X (B)
Finland X (B)
France X(B)
Germany X(B+W)
Ireland X(B+W)
Italy X (B) X (B+W)
Nl X(B+W)
Portugal X (B+W) X(B+W)
Spain X (B+W) X (B+W)
Sweden X(B+W)
UK X (B+W)
Note: B = black information. W = white information.
Source: Survey of credit bureaus.
An important consideration in information collection is the length of time that negative information
should remain in an individual’s credit history. If the negative information remains on the record
for an indefinite period, the borrower will have no incentive to improve his or her personal financial
habits.
The cost of accessing a credit bureau’s database is not a negligible factor since that cost is finally
passed along to the borrower. The fee varies from one EU country to another, with the average
report estimated at between $1-2 each (Jappelli and Pagano, 2000). Pricing structures, however,
make the comparison difficult, due to the variety of information that can be provided and the
practice of discussing the deals individually with credit institutions (see Table 3).
In many cases, the cost of the credit report is negotiated with the financial institution, depending on
the volume; otherwise, the cost of running the credit bureaus is shared amongst all users, as a flat
fee. Although the cost might seem small it is not negligible, i.e. it may not be very relevant for
mortgage loans, but it can still be important for credit of small amounts granted to purchase retail
goods.AMPARO SAN JOSÉ RIESTRA
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Table 3. Sample prices of credit bureaus in Europe
Providing negative information Providing positive information
Austria Average €0.5/report
plus fixed fee €200-€600
Between €1.08 and €2.76/report
plus fixed fee €200-€600
Belgium
Approx. €0.10/report depending on volume
€0.45/report (NBB)
Denmark €537,52 to €2418,87/year,
plus € 1.34/report
Finland Annual fee €50
€ 0.60/report
Germany Between €0.5 to €3 depending on the type of information, B or W
Ireland €1.86 to €2.22/report,
depending on volume
Italy €18,000/year (depending on the number of
members)
€2.3/report
Netherlands €0.453/report
Portugal Average €0.70-€0.80/report Average €0.50-€0.60
Sweden Between €2 and €6/report depending on the type of information, B or W
UK Between €0.5 and €3/report depending on the type of information, B or W
Source: National credit bureaus.
Individuals also have access to their records, although often at higher prices. In countries such as
Denmark, Sweden and Belgium, access to these records is free, whereas in the rest of Europe it
varies from €4 to €8/report.
2.3 EU national credit bureaus
We have already indicated that national credit bureaus within the EU operate in different legal and
economic environments; hence, national credit reporting industries have distinctive elements. In the
following section, we provide a comparative overview of the basic features characterising credit-
reporting arrangements at national level.
Austria. The KSV private credit bureau collects both positive and negative information, which is
exchanged between banks, insurance and leasing companies throughout Austria. Mail order,
telecommunication and other user organisations participate only in the exchange of negative
information.
KVS is a private association owned by members which contribute a small membership fee
(between €200 and €600 a year) depending on the size of the organisation. The cost per report
varies according to whether it is provided on or off-line, and covers positive or negative records.
The average charge for negative reports is €0.5, while positive reports cost between €1.08 and
€2.76.
Records are kept in the files for up to three years, if the debt has been recovered by the lender or a
maximum of 30 years for unpaid amounts. The threshold for the collection of positive information
is €1,000 and €35 for negative.
Belgium. Private registries existed in Belgium prior to the creation of a public registry by the
National Bank of Belgium (NBB). The registry of the Belgian association of consumer credit
companies,  Union Professionnelle du Crédit (UPC), has existed for more than 50 years. This
registry consists of 60 financial institution members of UPC, representing 96% of the BelgianCREDIT BUREAUS IN TODAY’S CREDIT MARKETS
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consumer credit market and 90% of the housing credit sector. It also covers credit for professional
use, leasing to independent and liberal professions and credit cards.
The public registry, which has more recently been established (1987), makes reporting compulsory
and thus, covers in totality the consumer credit and mortgage market. Consultation of the public
registry, prior to the granting of credit, is compulsory for credit companies. Individuals must be
informed of their inclusion in any negative registry listing.
National legislation prohibits the use of either registry for any use outside the scope of the
assessment of creditworthiness, credit management or the verification of other payment
instruments, such as cheques. Negative data are kept in the registry between a minimum of one year
and a maximum of 10 years. The Belgian government recently approved legislation permitting the
creation of a positive registry managed by the Belgian Central Bank. The present law allows for the
creation of positive registries of private origin.
Denmark. Negative payment reports issued by Denmark’s credit bureau are based on data received
from customers, combined with data from the Danish Official Gazette (i.e. sales by court order,
bankruptcies and initial cancellations of debts), which registers debts above €134. When lenders
report a debtor to RKI Kredit Information A/S, the bureau sends a letter of notification informing
the debtor that he or she has been registered with RKI. This letter has two purposes. First of all, it
informs the debtor of his registration (which often results in the debtor paying off his debt in order
to have his name deleted from the registry), and second, it enables the debtor to contact the credit
bureau directly if he or she feels that the registration is unfair. In accordance with the Danish Data
Protection Act, the credit bureau is required to delete the registration after five years, but the debtor
has the option of being removed from the registry before then, by clearing the debt with the credit
institution.
France. This is one of the countries where restrictive data protection provisions have hampered the
development of credit bureaus. At present, there exists only a public registry of negative
information, which is managed by the Bank of France. Although the question of whether to
establish a positive central registry often arises, arguments in this direction have not been
successful.
Germany. The first public registry in Europe was established in this country in 1934; it is owned
and operated by the Bundesbank. Private banks and retailers own Schufa Holding AG, the largest
private credit bureau in Germany dating from 1927. It covers a large part of the population, about
55 million persons and debts of over €100 (approximately).
The information collected is both positive and negative, organisations providing negative
information can only access the same type of records. Prices vary depending on the information
demanded and provided. When positive data is released, the consent of the individual is requested.
Individuals also have the right to be notified of their listing and to correct, erase and block any data
that are incorrect.
Ireland. The 30 member companies of the Irish Credit Bureau send monthly updated information
to the credit reference agency. This includes the outstanding balance on any loan, any arrears that
may have arisen and a history of the last 24 repayments. Regardless of a loan's repayment record,
the bureau holds details for five years after the end of the agreement. Under Irish law, data can only
be kept on borrowers who agree to their listing in such a record, but most loan applications include
a credit reference consent provision.
Consumers can receive a copy of their personal credit information from the Irish Credit Bureau.
They can also have information rectified or erased, or have a statement appended where the data
are incomplete, incorrect or irrelevant for the purpose for which they are kept. Financial institutions
registered with the Irish Credit Bureau are required, on request from an applicant, to provide theAMPARO SAN JOSÉ RIESTRA
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name, address and telephone number of any credit reference agency used during the assessment of
a loan application, where such records might have had a bearing on the decision.
Italy.  This country has two well functioning credit bureaus, CTC (Consorzio per la tutela del
credito) and CRIF. CTC is a creation of financial companies and is established as a non-profit
company. It is a negative registry that covers 90% of the Italian market, with records of 700,000
bad payers. Information is updated monthly on the basis of homogeneous criteria by the great
majority of consumer credit companies (both captive and non-captive), which can download
complete files into their own databases, with the advantage of being able to consult the information
in a preliminary way.
The largest private credit bureau in Italy is CRIF, which collects both positive and negative
information for all types of loans without a minimum threshold. CRIF mainly lists customers of
banks, recording roughly 650,000 loans. While CTC is significant with regard to irregularities in
the non-banking field (in terms of volume, 65% concern car finance), CRIF represents the most
complete existing file of bank origin. CRIF has records on 21 million people with outstanding debts
in Italy. The information collected comprises the name, address and tax identification or fiscal code
of the individual, the amount and type of loan, the number of non-paid instalments found and
whether the loan is guaranteed by collateral.
The Netherlands. The Dutch Bureau Krediet Registratie, BKR, established in 1965, is considered
by many as an excellent example of a positive central registry. It is the leading credit bureau in the
Netherlands, covering close to 100% of the market and 6.5 million people. All banks and financial
institutions lending to consumers contribute data to the registry, and it plans to include telecom
companies in the future. The registry does not include positive information on mortgage borrowing,
but only lists instalments that have been due for more than 120 days.
The cost of a report for a borrower is €0.43 and €4.53 for the consumer. In case of error, the
borrower has to contact the lender, who will transmit an order to BKR to make the correction.
The positive data collected cover the amount, type and terms of a loan, the start and end date and
for some types of loans, the date when the loan is likely to end. Demographic data are collected
only for identification purposes, namely, name, address and date of birth. Past default incidents that
remain unpaid will be kept on the record for an unlimited period, whereas those that are eventually
paid are kept in the registry for five years, ensuring that lenders can distinguish those individuals
who are delaying payments systematically.
Portugal. The main credit bureau in this country is Credinformações, which, as is also the case in
Spain, is a joint venture between ASFAC (Associação das Financeiras para Aquisição a  Crédito)
and Equifax, established in 1995. Credinformações collects both positive and negative data only
from financial institutional members of ASFAC. There are more than half a million entries in the
database (mainly negative). The Bank of Portugal also runs a credit bureau to which financial
institutions are obliged to supply information.
Portuguese social and cultural attitudes towards the exchange of information and the involvement
of the public sector in this area have delayed the extension of the credit bureau to the rest of the
financial sector. The Banking Secrecy Act does not allow sharing information between financial
and non-financial companies; for this reason, no telecoms or utility company contributes data to the
registry.
Since the beginning of the 1970s, the Bank of Portugal has managed a registry that records end-of
month balances from all lending institutions in Portugal and distributes the aggregated data to
lenders in the system. The minimum aggregated debt of individuals registered is €50.
Spain. A public central registry is managed in Spain by the Bank of Spain. It registers all
outstanding credit above €6,000 (approximately) and is a positive registry. This threshold impliesCREDIT BUREAUS IN TODAY’S CREDIT MARKETS
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that a large number of consumer credit loans are not registered by the public credit bureau.
Reporting to the Bank of Spain is compulsory for credit institutions.
The largest private credit bureau is a joint venture of Equifax-ASNEF, the Spanish federation of
finance companies, established in 1994. Telecommunication companies also feed the registry.
The legal framework for credit bureaus in Spain deserves particular attention since the operation of
credit bureaus requires authorisation from the Competition Court (Tribunal de Defensa de la
Competencia, TDC). Such practice is based on the following two assumptions:
•  Credit reporting agencies constitute a form of trust between companies in the same sector to
exchange information that will influence their commercial strategies, and therefore, this
practice is prohibited.
•  When companies exchanging information do not belong to the same sector, and therefore
are not competitors, the existence of credit reporting agencies contributes to the
improvement of commercial activities in the economy.
 2
These concerns of the Competition Court followed the establishment of a sector-oriented central
registry of defaulters in the Spanish film distribution industry, whose circulation of information that
identified ‘excessive risks’ gave rise to anti-competitive behaviour by distributors.
At present, credit-reporting agencies can obtain authorisation for five years and collect the same
information as the Risk Central at the Bank of Spain. Nevertheless, regulation remains an important
issue closely followed by the TDC and the Data Protection Agency, which often have different
criteria (e.g. TDC write-off paid debts three months after payment whereas it is instantaneous in the
case of the DPA).
Sweden. This country has developed credit bureaus similar to those operating in the US, i.e. with
comprehensive registries containing both black and white information. The Swedish UC AB
collects negative and positive information comprising demographic and credit-type information,
and other financial information such as business activities of the individual, tax information
(income tax, property tax and taxable wealth) and properties owned by the consumer.
In the case of American credit bureaus, information can only be released for the regulated purposes
identified. Since the information is widely available not only to financial institutions but also to
telecoms and oil companies and government, or for the leasing of apartments, it differs from the
continental model of credit bureaus. In all cases, UC has to forward a copy of the report to the
individual concerned, stating to whom the report was released.
Registration of a black record is not arbitrary; it first has to be recognised by the Swedish
authorities as a formal payment claim. If the payment is recovered later, the record remains in the
file until the end of the current year, plus three extra years (on average three and a half years).
Unpaid incidents remain in the file as long as the lender is attempting to recover; if the lender
abandons pursuit of the recovery, the record is held for ten years.
Information available in the credit bureau is widely used by financial institutions to construct
generic scorecards. Given their tested accuracy, many large financial institutions that initially
created their own application-based scorecards are now using generic scorecards.
United Kingdom. The UK credit bureau industry is well developed; it too resembles the
circumstances in the US, with the participation of only private credit bureaus – in particular the
dominant US companies, Equifax and Experian.
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Information collected by credit bureaus comes mainly from three types of sources: banks and
financial institutions, telecoms and utility companies and retailers. All of them provide negative and
positive information. Information from credit partners is distributed on a reciprocal basis; i.e.
companies providing negative information can only access negative data. English credit bureaus
also possess information contained on the electoral roll. This is an important element, since in the
UK and the US the electoral rolls, and credit bureaus, are used to verify the address of a person,
whereas in other countries the search will be done through an identity card number.
Together, the negative and positive information collected covers 70 to 80% of the population. The
figure for exclusively positive information is lower.
United States. The country where credit bureaus first developed has seen a concentration of
industry players in recent years. Presently, only three big credit bureaus operate nation-wide and
they share the market between them. US credit bureaus possess the most comprehensive data in the
world. Information is stored on over 200 million adult residents and over two million credit reports
are sold every day by the credit bureaus (Barron and Staten, 2000). Positive data collected include
all details of defaults and bankruptcies, as well as complete information on outstanding credit.
Credit bureaus are only allowed to release information regarding transactions initiated by
customers. Defaults can only be kept for 7 years, 10 in the case of bankruptcy.
2.4 International arrangements for the exchange of information
The interconnection of existing credit bureaus is already underway in Europe. Given the
fundamental differences when compared to the US market, however, where three private credit
bureaus dominate, one should not expect the same concentration in the EU market, at least not in
the short-term.
Achieving economies of scale, which imply that the larger the bureau the more complete the
information is, has been the major motivation behind the merger process in the US, together with
technology, deregulation of credit markets and integration of national economies. In the EU, the
need for a single credit market and cross-border credit are the main factors driving the cross-border
exchange of information. Cross-border exchange of information is, however, hampered by the
reduced mobility of retail borrowers outside their own country. Banks and financial institutions
therefore do not have sufficient incentive to further implement this exchange.
Given the considerable political and economic weight of banks and financial institutions in Europe,
as well as the existing fragmentation, it is difficult to predict whether the industry is heading
towards harmonisation. It is clear that with an increasing number of people in circulation within the
EU, and the international operation of European banks and financial institutions, credit bureaus will
be led, albeit slowly, to higher cross-border exchange of information. At present, there are some
bilateral agreements in progress between the credit bureaus of several countries: Schufa Holding
(Germany), KSV (Austria), BKR (Holland), CRIF (Italy) and NBB (Belgium). Some Anglo-Saxon
organisations, on the other hand, are trying to extend operations to other countries (e.g. Experian
and Equifax are expanding to Italy, Spain and Portugal).
The European Association of consumer credit information suppliers (ACCIS) is working towards
the creation of a network of credit registries. After an initial discussion among the members with
regard to the information to be exchanged, they have agreed upon the Key Factor System. This
system will grant financial institutions access to cross-border records through their national credit
bureaus on a reciprocal basis, i.e. Italian financial institutions requiring information through CTC
(negative information) will have access to only negative information on Dutch individuals.
Key Factor is a technological platform that filters the information distributed according to the
information provided by the credit bureau. At present, only the Dutch BKR, the German Schufa
and the Italian CRIF are operational in the system. It is expected that the rest of the ACCISCREDIT BUREAUS IN TODAY’S CREDIT MARKETS
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members will join over the course of the next few years. It remains to be seen, however, whether
credit bureaus that are not ACCIS members, such as France, will join the platform.
3. Legal and regulatory issues
There is a general consensus in our society that the use of personal data, including the storage and
security of such data, must be controlled. Furthermore, there is agreement that these concerns
should be balanced by the legitimate interest of commercial or non-commercial organisations to
process certain data. This is the case regarding financial data, since it allows minimising the risk of
fraud and bad debts.
Public policy recognises that it is necessary for consumers to reveal some information related to
their financial history when applying for credit. If consumers consider that the requested
information is appropriate to allow for a thorough assessment of their creditworthiness, they are
more apt to disclose private information in exchange for economic benefits. Often, however,
consumers do not have a choice if they do not want to be refused credit. If the consumer, therefore,
provides information in order to obtain credit, he should be assured that it is only within this
framework that the data will be handled.
Consumers cannot always have control over the information held by businesses on their finances or
themselves. At the same time, difficulties often arise for the consumer, due to this loss of control
over personal information. Achieving a balance between both sets of interests is not easy. If
regulation is too little, it might allow for the abuse of unscrupulous operators; likewise, if regulation
is too strict, it can interfere in the legitimate functioning of businesses. Indeed, the degree of
privacy protection plays an important role in the development of credit bureaus, as shown by the
different environments of the US and France.
Nowadays, advances in computer technology and telecommunications allow personal data to travel
across borders with much greater ease. Information relating to an individual’s ‘personal data’ is
collected and used for many aspects of everyday life. Personal data can be collected directly from
the individual or from an existing database, and may subsequently be used for other purposes
and/or shared with other parties.
In this context, national laws regarding data protection demand good data management practices on
the part of data processing entities. These laws must guarantee the rights of the individual, such as
the right to be informed when personal information is being processed, the reason for this
processing, the right to access the data, the right to have the data amended or deleted and the right
to object to certain data processing. Equally, the collection of ‘sensitive data’ is regulated
everywhere in Europe. Data protection authorities, which exist in all EU countries, act as
watchdogs to ensure the application of privacy laws.
The development of a frontier-free internal market and the development of the so-called
‘information society’ imply that processing of personal data will grow irrespective of national
boundaries, and that data concerning the citizens of one member state are increasingly processed in
other member states of the EU.
3.1 The general framework of data protection
Since the 1970s, several member states of the European Union have passed legislation protecting
the fundamental rights of individuals, and in particular their right to privacy from abuses resulting
from the processing of personal data (i.e. the collection, use and storage thereof). International
institutions such as the United Nations, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation andAMPARO SAN JOSÉ RIESTRA
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Development (OECD) and the Council of Europe
3 have produced legal texts addressing these
issues.
Data protection laws provide for a series of rights for the individual. These laws generally demand
good data management practice on the part of the entities that process data (‘data controllers’) and
cover a series of obligations. These include: 1) the obligation to use personal data only for
specified, explicit and legitimate purposes; 2) the obligation to guarantee the security of the data
against accidental, unauthorised access, or manipulation; and, in some cases, 3) the obligation to
notify a specific independent supervisory body before carrying out all, or certain types of, data
processing operations. These laws normally provide for certain safeguards or special procedures to
be applied in the case of transfers of data abroad.
National data protection laws, however, feature some differences that could potentially create
obstacles to the free flow of information or additional burdens for economic operators and citizens.
Directive 95/46/EC on data protection was therefore developed to harmonise national provisions in
this field. The Directive applies to any operation or set of operations that are performed on personal
data.
The Directive lays down common rules that firms must observe when collecting, holding or
transmitting personal data in their business or administrative activities. Of fundamental importance
for firms is the obligation to collect data only for specified, legitimate purposes and to hold only
data that is relevant, accurate and up-to-date. European citizens, in turn, are guaranteed a set of
rights: the right of access to their personal data, the right to correct any data that is inaccurate, the
right to know where the data originated, the right to refuse use of their data for activities such as
direct marketing and the right of recourse if unlawful processing has occurred. The Directive
prohibits the transfer of personal data to non-EU nations that do not meet the European ‘adequacy’
standard for privacy protection.
While the US and the EU share the goal of enhancing privacy protection for their citizens, their
respective regulatory approaches differ. The United States embraces a sector approach that relies on
a mix of legislation, regulation and self-regulation. In general, it can be said that EU and US data
protection regimes differ significantly, although they have similar elements. The differences are
based on cultural perceptions of privacy and personal information, and while Europeans approach
the issue from the human rights perspective, the US understanding allows for a more liberal
approach in which the economic good of information prevails (Jentzsch, 2001).
The approach of the US and the EU towards Internet technology also differs, the former being
based on self-regulation, the latter on the drafting of comprehensive legislation. The US Fair
Trade Commission (FTC) believes that self-regulation offers the best means for protecting
consumers’ online privacy for several reasons. First, voluntary codes are, by definition,
developed and adopted by those with the greatest expertise and sensitivity to industry practices
and conditions. Second, self-regulatory codes can be formulated and revised more promptly
when necessary than can legislative codes. This allows firms to respond quickly to the rapidly
evolving nature of the Internet and computer technology and to employ emerging technologies
to protect consumer privacy. Third, when regulation is voluntarily adopted, compliance tends to
be broader and enforcement more prompt. Finally, where an industry can regulate itself, the
government need not devote as many of its limited resources to the task; therefore,
encouragement of self-regulation is often an efficient and effective way for an agency to
leverage its enforcement budget (FTC).
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Recently, the FTC, following an extensive survey of websites containing personal information,
acknowledged consumer concerns regarding privacy on-line and the limited success of self-
regulatory efforts to date. Consequently, the FTC has recommended to Congress the need to enact
legislation in the field to complement self-regulation and consumer and business education (FTC,
2000).
By contrast, the European Union relies on comprehensive legislation that requires, for instance, the
creation of government data protection agencies, registration of databases with those agencies and
in some cases, prior approval before personal data processing can begin.
In order to bridge these differences and facilitate the compliance of US companies with the
Directive, both economic areas engaged in discussions to develop the ‘safe harbour’ framework.
Compliance with the safe harbour concept will assure EU organisations that a US company
provides ‘adequate’ privacy protection, as defined in the Directive (Art. 25, para. 2).
3.2 Privacy in credit markets: The US vs the EU
The degree of privacy protection agreed upon varies from country to country. Japelli and Pagano
(2000a) label as ‘low protection’ regimes those countries where information on borrowers’ data can
be accessed no matter the purpose, and as ‘high protection’ regimes those where information can
only be accessed following the borrower’s explicit consent. In a mid-range situation, we find
countries where information is released following the involvement of customers in certain credit
operations, such as applying for a loan or credit card, but without the customer’s explicit consent.
The European Union places a significant regulatory burden on the credit reporting industry. The
EU privacy directive greatly limits sharing of personal information, including credit data in credit
bureaus (Galindo and Miller, 2001). Under directive 95/46/EC, automated data can only be
accessed in the course of entering or performing a contract, and the directive falls within the ‘high
protection’ category mentioned earlier. The European framework of data protection also provides
the rights of notification when data are held on an individual or correction where there are any
errors in the record. As with many other directives relevant to consumer protection, Directive
95/46/EC follows the minimal harmonisation approach, allowing member states to apply more
restrictive provisions (see Annex II for a detailed listing of applicable laws in each EU member
state). Additional legislation is provided at the national level.
In comparison to Europe, the US has a very open system for credit reporting with a relatively light
regulatory approach. The US has allowed a significant degree of self-regulation by the credit
reporting industry, which is done through the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) and the numerous
state laws that deal with it. The FCRA sets forth legal standards governing the collection, use and
communication of credit data and certain other information about consumers. A revised FCRA
4 set
new obligations for creditors and credit bureaus, imposing tighter conditions in order to address
growing consumer concerns with privacy abuses by the industry. Enforcement, accuracy and
privacy protection were to be enhanced by the new act.
Amendments included an opt-out procedure for inclusion in future lists. Consumers thereby gain
protection against unsolicited credit offers, including the multiple credit card offers that many
consumers receive on a daily basis. Previously, creditors were able to use the credit reporting
agencies’ file information as a basis for developing lists of consumers to whom to send offers.
Other significant amendments refer to information disputed by consumers in case of inaccuracies or
errors. When a consumer disputes information in his or her file with the credit bureau, the
implicated creditor has to check the possible error, review the information and report inaccurate or
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incomplete information to all national credit bureaus. Furthermore, the new amendments establish a
30-day limit for the credit bureaus to resolve consumer disputes.
The US data protection legislation is completed with the 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which
imposes significant restrictions on the ability of financial institutions to transfer the non-public
personal information about their customers to a non-affiliated third party. One such example is
when a bank shares the names and addresses of its customers with a wholly separate merchant. The
Act basically requires that financial institutions must allow consumers to choose whether to have
their non-public personal information disclosed to a non-affiliated third party. Before a financial
institution shares such information with a non-affiliated third party, the institution must provide the
consumer with a copy of this third party privacy policy. The financial institution must also give
consumers notice of their right to ‘opt-out’, and give them the opportunity to exercise this right.
The Act requires that financial institutions must allow consumers to decide whether to have their
non-public personal information disclosed to a non-affiliated third party.
A very important difference between US and EU laws is the opt-out
5 system in the US as compared
to the opt-in system in the EU. Jentzsch (2001) points out that when the purpose is to collect
extensive data, opt-out systems are regulators’ preferred choice. Nevertheless, despite the presence
of an opt-in system in Europe, in practice the consumer is rarely asked to opt-in, and an implicit
consent is assumed. In Germany, for example, although the unambiguous consent of the borrower
is necessary for positive information, denial of data transfer to the credit bureau will result in the
refusal of credit.
With regard to the secondary uses of data, the EU is more restrictive than the US, where the opt-out
approach is the rule, and where regulations provide transparency in data processing and establish
registers of data collectors. New initiatives, such as the directive on data protection in electronic
communications, do not achieve harmonisation between national laws; instead, they open the door
to a variety of systems, as in the instance of the opt-in or opt-out system for commercial
communications. Higher harmonisation and complete implementation of the data protection
directive might be needed.
4. Preliminary issues for discussion
At the heart of the debate on information recorded in registries is a confrontation between basic
principles. While it seems necessary to guarantee individual privacy protection on the one hand,
there are on the other those who advocate that collection and use of positive information can play a
role in combating over-indebtedness situations, which are associated with adverse social
consequences.
Credit bureaus are an important element in the development of an integrated  cross-border retail
credit market. In this sense, the benefits of the exchange of information to the development of
cross-border credit are incontestable, and therefore it would be desirable to allow for a system for
the exchange of information. Nevertheless, the differences amongst European credit bureaus
concerning the data collected and national legal provisions hamper the exchange of information.
The possibilities for the establishment of this necessary exchange vary from the implementation of
legal provisions at EU level, to the conclusion of voluntary bilateral or multilateral agreements. For
the time being, agreements between credit bureaus in Europe are taking place on a voluntary basis.
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4.1 Positive versus negative data: The protection of privacy
Credit bureaus’ activity is regulated almost everywhere under general data protection laws and in
some countries they are also the object of specific laws.
6 Privacy laws cover many aspects such as
access to files, the nature of data (positive and negative), the elimination of records after a time or
the limitation of certain types of information. Stringent rules apply to the processing of sensitive
data, namely, data relating to racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical
beliefs, trade union membership and health concerns.
To avoid the arbitrary use of credit bureaus’ information, regulation of this market is essential. If
there is no uniform and transparent regulation for the use of credit bureaus’ data, a perverse
decision may result. For instance, an individual who has a low-profile credit record (e.g. from
failing to pay a parking fine or a telephone bill due to a particular conflict with the company
providing phone service, or due to ethical concerns about certain types of taxes from the public
sector), will have a negative entry that could result in his being refused credit. The collection and
dissemination by credit bureaus of this type of information has little to do with unreliable credit
behaviour, and can exclude these individuals from credit markets. Moreover, full de-regulation of
credit bureaus will result in biased behaviour by banks (Rubini, 2000).
National and European laws regulate the establishment of credit bureaus gathering positive or
negative data. In general, it can be said that countries with Napoleonic codes (i.e. southern
European countries),
7 are more in favour of negative data, whereas Anglo-Saxon countries, with
common laws, are more in favour of the compilation of positive data, the model pioneered by the
US.
Boyes, Hoffmann and Low
8 go further in the consideration of the data to be collected by credit
bureaus. They consider the exclusion of variables such as race, sex, religion, ethnic background or
other personal data as a degradation of the lender’s ability to separate good from bad borrowers,
inadvertently causing the reallocation of funds from consumer lending to other products. For them,
the efficiency of lenders in assessing creditors is a more powerful argument than individual data
protection and discrimination concerns.
This reasoning would lead to the conclusion that the existence of positive credit bureaus in a
country would have a favourable impact on the rate of default. Nevertheless, the impact of positive
records on the effectiveness of the overall assessment of risk is doubtful. Financial institutions,
banks and all credit grantors base their credit risk assessment on their own databases of customers,
constructed over many years of operations, which constitutes therefore one of their competitive
assets, and not in positive data collected by credit bureaus.
Further consideration should be given to what constitutes essential information to facilitate the
credit assessment process. It calls, perhaps, for further harmonisation of data protection laws. Data
protection laws within the EU context for instance, prevent in some countries the collection by
credit bureaus of data such as bankruptcies, legal incapacity, judicial resolutions for illness or
mental reasons and judgements concerning financial crime. Without being a pure incident of
default payment, these can be considered important elements in the assessment of repayment. Art.
8, para. 5 of the Data Protection Directive offers flexible criteria for assessment, and thus, opens the
door to diverse national legislation in this field.
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7 France has a negative public register. Spain has positive public registry, but only allows the operation of
private negative registries. Italy, however, has positive registries.
8 The American Bankers Association, Consumer Credit Delinquency Bulletin, Third quarter, 1999 (cited
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Box 1. The ambiguity of defining privacy
To illustrate the controversy concerning what constitutes excessive or justified collection of
information by credit bureaus, let us look at the argument put forward by the French CNIL
(Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés).
The CNIL prevented several credit grantors from using borrowers’ nationality as a factor to
estimate their repayment ability. CNIL inspections found that scoring techniques often used
categories such as français,  CEE, and ‘other’. The purpose of the inclusion of such criteria,
according to credit institutions, is to facilitate the assessment of the difficulty to recover the debt in
the case of the borrower moving to his country of origin. However, the CNIL sustained that a more
appropriate criterion for foreign residents would be the inclusion of the ‘titre de séjour’ validity
period. It would constitute a relevant variable at least for long-term credits. Furthermore, CNIL
argued that nationality does not constitute a determining criterion for the assessment of payment
behaviour independently of social, financial and economic conditions of the borrower.
Later, the Conseil d’Etat annulled the CNIL decision and recognised that when the result of scoring
techniques do not exclude automatically the individual treatment of the demand of credit, the
information regarding nationality is adequate and permissible.
Sources: CNIL 1998 press release published on its website and Resolution from the Conseil d’Etat regarding
to the file n° 204909, 30 October 2001.
4.2 Positive versus negative data: Any links with over-indebtedness?
Since the 1980s, European household debt has been on the rise. Indeed, indebtedness has begun to
attract the attention of policy-makers and the media, especially given the current perception of
dangerous indebtedness in the US market and decreasing savings ratios. The US ‘open credit
society’ model began to be imported to Europe at a significant level as early as the 1960s. Despite
this, links have not yet been established between the credit reporting scenario, the level of
indebtedness and the occurrence of over-indebtedness. We shall see in the following discussion that
there is no reason to think that the collection of positive vs. negative data affects the level of
indebtedness or over-indebtedness.
The first element to consider is the level of household indebtedness, which has seen a steady
increase over the past few decades. So far, the debate on the economic impact of indebtedness
ratios in Europe is not particularly intense, since indebtedness levels are in most of the EU
countries far below those of the US (see Table 4).
An important element to be taken into account in analysing levels of indebtedness is the relation
between the different types of credit. The distribution of credit to individuals between consumer
credit and other credit (mainly mortgages) varies significantly across countries. For instance, we
see in Figure 3 that the Netherlands, which is one of the most heavily indebted countries, is to a
large extent burdened due to housing credit. The contrary applies to Greece and Italy, both with low
levels of indebtedness, both for mortgages and consumer credit. These differences should certainly
be taken into consideration, as specific solutions will be required to fight over-indebtedness.
Although the rise of indebtedness is not particularly worrying from a macroeconomic point of
view, it is believed to generate serious social consequences for households. The perceived dangers
of high indebtedness levels for the economy should, however, be treated with prudence and take
into account the ‘wealth effect’. The wealth effect implies that consumers’ growing debt-financed
spending is based on their assumption that stock prices will provide a steady stream of capital gains
for the indefinite future. Broader household participation in the stock market has generated an
increase in their financial assets, diluting the weight of debt in the financial situation of households.CREDIT BUREAUS IN TODAY’S CREDIT MARKETS
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Table 4. Indebtedness levels as a percentage of disposable income
1995 1999
Netherlands  89.4  118.1
Sweden 75.9  105.0
UK 97.9 101.6
Japan 85.0 100.2
US 83.3  97.5
Germany 49.9  63.7
Portugal 48.7  73.1
Austria 60.0  52.3
France 47.3  49.7
Belgium 42.4  45.7
Finland 38.5  44.2
Italy 32.9  34.2
Spain 31.6  29.7
Greece 6.8  14.0
Average 56.4  67.1
Note: The ratio has been rising for Sweden since 1995, but it is lower
than the record level achieved in 1980, when it was close to
135%.
Source: ECRI, based on central banks’ annual reports and national accounts.
Figure 3. Consumer credit and housing credit as a percentage of GDP
Source: ECRI, based on data drawn from central banks and national statistical offices.
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The second element to consider is the phenomenon of over-indebtedness across the EU. It has to be
noted that despite the public interest attracted by over-indebtedness, it is difficult to carry out an
accurate assessment of the situation in Europe. The evaluation of the reality of excessive
indebtedness is hampered by a lack of statistical data. Furthermore, a common definition at EU
level that allows for the establishment of relevant comparisons is currently non-existent.
Definitions vary from recognising over-indebtedness only by the initiation of bankruptcy
procedures, to the more flexible criteria that regards as over-indebted those individuals or families
who merely perceive they have difficulties in repaying their contracted debts, without any default
incident. The Economic and Social Committee of the EU, for instance, defines over-indebtedness
as the state in which a household is ‘objectively unable, on a structural and ongoing basis, to pay
short-term debts taken out to meet needs considered to be essential, from their habitual income
provided by work, financial investments or other usual sources, without recourse to loans to finance
debts contracted previously’.
9 The industry often classifies a credit as a default when ‘the individual
has failed to repay three consecutive instalments’.
Any efforts to measure the magnitude of over-indebtedness at EU level are impeded by the above-
mentioned lack of a common definition and therefore comparable statistics. A recent study
commissioned by DG SANCO estimates that 18% of families in the EU are over-indebted, a figure
that the present study finds exaggerated. Such a high estimate is the outcome of a broad definition
of over-indebtedness: ‘A person is over-indebted if he or she considers that they have difficulties in
repaying debts, whether consumer or mortgage debt’ (ORC Macro, 2002).
Table 5 below shows some of the results of studies carried out at national level. In Belgium, for
instance, the UPC registers 500,000 individuals with negative records in a population of over 10
million people, which gives a ratio of 5%. Since negative records are kept in the register over some
time, however, it includes all individuals that have a negative entry due to problems in the past, not
necessarily at present. In France according the Commission d’endettement,
10 over-indebtedness
concerns 2% of the total of families with outstanding debt. Table 5 presents estimations of over-
indebtedness according to different sources in France, Belgium, the UK, Germany, the Netherlands
and Sweden.
The third element to be taken into account in the study of over-indebtedness is its cause. According
to surveys carried out in France
11 and Belgium, it seems that the use of credit is not the only factor
causing repayment difficulties faced by over-indebted households, though it is clear that the
accumulation of credit contributes to aggravate their financial situation. The advent of external
factors is the main cause for the inability of individuals or families to repay debts, It seems clear
that the expansion of consumer credit, often blamed for the growth of over-indebtedness, it is
actually not decisive.
Classified by the type of debt affected, over-indebted families belong to two main groups; those
who accumulated an excess of consumer credit debt, and those families with one or several housing
credits, often combined also with consumer credit debt. There is also a small percentage of families
whose over-indebtedness is non-credit related, for instance taxation or clearing of legal procedures.
                                                
9 From the Information report of the Section for the Single Market, Production and Consumption on
Household over-indebtedness, CES 212/2000 fin, Int/043.
10 Indebtedness Commission. Over-indebtedness is defined as having a credit default dossier deposited
with the Commission for over-indebtedness.
11 http://www.senat.fr/rap/r97-060/r97-0606.htmlCREDIT BUREAUS IN TODAY’S CREDIT MARKETS
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Table 5. Over-indebtedness in Europe: A preliminary approach
Source A
% of total
population Source B
% of total
population
France 500,000 families
a 2.0%
Belgium 113,000 families
b 2.5% 30,000-40,000 families
c 0.8%
UK 1 million individuals
d 1.6% 200,000 individuals
Germany 2.5-2.7 million families
e 7%
Netherlands 200,000 families
f 2.9%
Sweden 430,000 individuals
g 4.5%
a IEIC, ‘Etat du surendettement : éléments statistiques’, September 2000.
b Data from Groupe Action Surendettement de Belgique (Belgium Over-indebtedness Action Group). No
definition of over-indebtedness given.
c Estimated by the industry.
d NACAB publishes statistics that quote one million enquiries, not actual people. It is often the case,
however, that a person with a debt problem will phone several times. In a letter to the editor of Credit
Finance 2001, Nick Pearson, a former employee of NACAB calculates the number of  enquiries at
roughly 200,000.
e IEIC, ‘Etat du surendettement: Eléments statistiques’, September 2000.
f IEIC, ‘Etat du surendettement: Eléments statistiques’, September 2000.
g Individuals with non-settled formal payment claims included in the credit bureau. Past payment
incidents settled with the lender are not included.
Tables 6 and 7 illustrate the causes of over-indebtedness based on surveys carried out in the
Pontoise region of France and in Belgium.
Table 6. Causes of over-indebtedness found by the Indebtedness Commission in the
Pontoise region of France
Indebtedness factors Percent of total
Unemployment situation 42
Illness 11
Divorce or death of a partner 20
Suppression or reduction of social benefits 4
Other 23
Source: http://www.senat.fr/rap/r97-060/r97-0607.html.
The Pontoise Indebtedness Commission differentiated between active and passive over-
indebtedness. Active over-indebtedness is characterised by the exaggerated accumulation of credit
related to income, whereas passive over-indebtedness is caused by the advent of an external event
that affects one’s ability to repay. Overall passive over-indebtedness amounts to around half of the
total.AMPARO SAN JOSÉ RIESTRA
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Table 7. Causes of over-indebtedness in Belgium
% %
Life events 44.8 High indebtedness level 31.27
Unemployment 18.84 Excessive charges 16.09
Illness 6.64 Unexpected charges 3.15
Divorce 7.65 Provision of false information 8.44
Decease 4.56 Fiscal debts 0.34
Other 5.62 Others 3.26
Non-financial causes 14.96 Liquidity difficulties 6.52
Carelessness 13.16 Other 2.36
Supplier litigation 0.79
Marriage litigation 1.01
Source: ABB (1996).
From an analysis of the above results, it can be concluded that over-indebtedness is more often due
to the occurrence of an event in an individual’s personal life that disrupts the household’s budgetary
equilibrium and makes repayment difficult, than to the simple accumulation of debts.
There is a tendency to place the onus on the lender to assess and verify the consumer’s solvency.
Articulating the belief that ‘more information is better’, a report by the UK Department of Industry
and Trade on how to tackle over-indebtedness mentions that ‘the non-availability of data, such as
student loans, current account and overdraft details, income and other regular financial
commitments, e.g. rent and utility costs, precludes a full picture of the borrower being available’
(Dti, 2001). In line with this reasoning, it is often suggested that lenders should consult positive
databases of information on the financial situation of a household as an instrument to combat over-
indebtedness.
Nonetheless, even positive credit bureaus  do not include important aspects of a household’s
spending habits that are liable to have an influence on the ability to repay debts nor can a household
be expected to foresee the advent of external events. To fully represent the financial situation of a
household, credit bureaus should include information such as rent, utilities and other spending
habits that show the family income with respect to the total of payments to be made.
The evidence found in European and US markets does not support the argument that there is a
relationship between positive registries and lower levels of indebtedness. We observe that countries
with positive credit registries, such as the UK, the US, Germany and the Netherlands, also have a
high level of indebtedness (see Table 4), whereas Italy and Spain, which also operate positive
registries, rank at the lower end of the table. On the other hand, France and Belgium, which only
permit the operation of negative registries, have also kept low levels of indebtedness. Moreover,
one must bear in mind that so far, no relationship can be established between indebtedness and
over-indebtedness in light of the existing statistical data.
Given the facts presented in this section, it is difficult to argue that positive data collection could be
an important tool to reduce over-indebtedness. We argue, therefore, that obliging lenders to consult
positive information in credit bureaus is an excessively interventionist approach. Credit assessment
methods are a key know-how and a competitive advantage of lenders, for whom correct assessment
of borrowers’ applications is essential to their survival in the market.
In economic terms, the consultation and the maintenance costs of such a comprehensive registry
will be added to the bill of credit grantors, and ultimately to borrowers, whether good or bad payers,
and will have a special impact on smaller lenders and low-value loans. The higher cost of a positiveCREDIT BUREAUS IN TODAY’S CREDIT MARKETS
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registry is due not only to changes in its structure, the larger number of files treated or the
complexity of these files, but also to input of the data and follow-up
12 procedures for these
institutions. This, in turn, creates increasingly complex demands, such as the registration of
revolving credit, e.g. the need to determine whether new credit only or unused available credit
should be included in a particular case.
On the other hand, credit institutions might be tempted to use predatory practices made possible by
access to positive information and might exceed acceptable limits in granting credit to ‘good
payers’, in order to attract them to their institutions. Moreover, since credit bureaus are based on
reciprocity, stored data will be available to all those inputting data into the registry, which, in the
case of positive data, represents a sizeable number of organisations. This, in turn, gives rise to
further concerns about privacy.
4.3 Institutional implications of over-indebtedness
The measures intended to combat over-indebtedness vary between prevention, advice, support,
recovery and future social rehabilitation. Currently, countries approach over-indebtedness in many
different ways. These nationally divergent approaches may generate discriminatory treatment of
consumers and distortions of competition between economic operators. There are many aspects
involved, such as consumer-training and education on debt, regulation of credit contract terms and
practices of finance providers, the role of intermediaries, risk information, credit recovery
procedures and the consequences of over-indebtedness in terms of bankruptcy proceedings. All the
elements of the regulatory regime complement one another; their combination results in, more or
less, restrictive credit environments.
Diverse legal systems have different economic implications, and bankruptcy laws are one of the
elements that deserve explicit mention. The few studies that have been conducted on the impact of
bankruptcy laws on credit in an economy are based on the experience of the US market. European
provisions on debt settlement and bankruptcy are further proof of the diversity of EU national retail
credit markets. This report does not aim to go in-depth to study these differences, but to present
basic facts.
The limits to the open credit society
American law has a lax approach to individual bankruptcy that tends to avoid the problems of
liquidation and discharges the borrowers based on the ‘good faith’ assumption. In the United States,
consumer bankruptcy (Chapters 7 and 13 of the US Bankruptcy Code) is designed to give debtors a
‘fresh start’ at the expense of their creditors. After a household successfully files a Chapter 7
petition, its debts can be repaid only from wealth, and unsecured creditors cannot claim all the
applicant’s wealth. The law also establishes a wealth threshold for the discharge of unsecured
debts. Under Chapter 13, the creditor is able to claim from the future income of the debtor, but the
amount that can be reclaimed is also limited.
This ‘fresh start policy’ is founded on the concept of the ‘self-made man’. It rests on the principle
that consumers are economic operators in the market economy and that they should not be excluded
from participating in the market after a situation of over-indebtedness.  Over-indebtedness is
considered a normal consequence of business activity and the effects should be internalised by
credit providers.
Under the US regime the individual himself or, once the debt reaches a certain amount, the
creditors can request the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings, thereby opening the field to one of
                                                
12 Australian laws allow for the recording of outstanding debts; however, these should be removed in the
following 45 days to its settlement. Credit institutions therefore, generally opt for not including this type
of information.AMPARO SAN JOSÉ RIESTRA
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three possibilities: the rearrangement of debt, the adjustment of debt over a maximum period of five
years or liquidation. In this respect, a similar system is in place in Germany, allowing for the
liquidation of debtor assets or the rearrangement of debt (proving the good faith of the file
applicant).
The system, however, has to be approached with caution since it might lead to the strategic use of
bankruptcy. The recent explosion in personal bankruptcy filings in the US has motivated research
into whether credit markets are being adversely affected by generous legal provisions. Personal
bankruptcy filings have risen over 500% in the last two decades, with more than 1.2 million
individual filings for the year ending 31 March 2001, either under Chapter 7 or 13. Research
indicates that at least some of the individuals that voluntarily filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7,
which wipes out unsecured debt, appeared to have the economic capacity to repay a significant
portion of their debts within a repayment plan.
13
Figure 4. US personal bankruptcy petitions
(Twelve months, ending 31 December)
Source: CRC (2002). Data presented by the Credit Research Centre (CRC) at ECRI meeting 7 June 2002.
Furthermore, filing statistics may understate the importance of personal bankruptcy in the US as
many debtors may implicitly use the threat of filing to evade collection efforts by their creditors
(Hynes and Berkowitz, 1998).
The ‘democratisation’ of bank credit cards made credit more accessible to financially vulnerable
borrowers, with lower income households having a growing percentage of credit cards.  The
vigorous expansion of credit opportunities has brought portfolio exposure to households living
closer to the brink of payment troubles.  Delinquency rates in credit cards have remarkably
increased since 1995, and a reduction should not be expected in the near future.
In 1997, card issuers had gross losses of 6.6% of their portfolio, falling to 5.9% once recoveries are
taken into account (OECD, 2001). The US credit card industry has benefited from the expansion of
credit cards to the lower-income segments and has adapted to default levels that would have
shaken-up risk management departments a decade ago.
                                                
13 Chapter 13 gives a debtor the opportunity to restructure his or her debts using future earnings without
filing for bankruptcy.
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The democratisation of credit, generous exemptions (safety levels) of bankruptcy laws, the
reduction of the stigma associated with bankruptcy and the growing availability of post-bankruptcy
credit are the factors behind the growth of households filing for bankruptcy in the US. Endorsing
these findings the US is trying to move to a more restrictive regime for the discharge of personal
bad debts.
The ‘European model’ is based on the re-education of the consumer: the consumer has failed to
meet his moral obligations to society and should therefore bear the responsibility. Within the
welfare system, over-indebted consumers are viewed as victims and should therefore be assisted.
Latin countries put the onus on the sanctioning of borrowers that do not face their financial
obligations, whereas Anglo-Saxon legislation tends to be more lax. In general, European citizens do
not have access to lax individual bankruptcy provisions, and many countries tend nowadays to
focus on the establishment of efficient extra-judicial debt settlement arrangements. So far attempts
have not been as successful as they have been lengthy.
Bankruptcy provisions, however, are not the only legal element that affects the credit market. Based
on the Italian market, Fabbri and Padula (2001) study the impact of legal enforcement systems on
credit relationship between banks and consumers.
14 They conclude that a badly functioning judicial
system may cause households to be credit constrained, because banks would shelter their revenues
by demanding a minimum amount of collateral, which will be higher for less efficient judicial
systems. Second, the working of the judicial system can affect the amount of debt granted to all
consumers, through its impact on the cost of credit; all things being equal, the cost of debt is lower
where justice works better.
As we have seen, the issue of over-indebtedness has many facets. It is very important to ensure that
changes in the regulations in the field of indebtedness are not disproportionate to the size of the
loan and that they bring benefits to the consumer.
Prevention is the first key element to combat over-indebtedness. The occurrence of over-
indebtedness can be reduced by making the partners involved more responsible, by facilitating
access to information and by introducing changes to the existing insurance system. Consumer
information and responsible lending should be present in any public policy strategy. It is accepted
that consumers are not always aware of all the financial and legal aspects of borrowing, and often
enter into contracts that are cumbersome and confusing.
Recently, legal initiatives in the field of credit, such as the forthcoming revision of the Consumer
Credit Directive, have begun to target over-indebtedness. In order to reduce this phenomenon, the
potential contribution of positive information provided by credit bureaus is being assessed. As
mentioned earlier, the levels of over-indebtedness can hardly be related to the credit-reporting
environment. Moreover, individual action, targeted at one of the elements, would not be useful if it
is not complemented by other action in terms of prevention, consumer education and a legal
framework comprising marketing practices, settlement procedures and bankruptcy provisions. All
of the elements of the regulatory regime should be taken into account, bearing in mind that strong
punitive laws will discourage borrowing, while laws that are too lax will make borrowers less
cautious, thereby eventually reducing lending and increasing the cost of borrowing.
4.4 The challenge of the single retail credit market
As indicated in section 2, borrowers may have an incentive to signal their true risk level (if it is
low) or to disguise it (if it is high). This asymmetry of information becomes more acute when
dealing with cross-border credit. In fact, statistical evidence suggests that in practice a single credit
                                                
14 By assuming that the behaviour of legal institutions affects the liquidation value of the assets pledged
as collateral by the borrower.AMPARO SAN JOSÉ RIESTRA
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retail market does not exist.
15 The importance of the availability and quality of information on the
borrower’s credit history is even greater in the event of cross-border credit to consumers established
in different member states than that of the credit institution.
Over time, lenders learn to solve part of the problem created by asymmetry of information by
maintaining a continuous relationship with the borrower; acquiring ‘proprietary’ information about
their creditworthiness, and therefore a certain degree of informational monopoly about their
customers, and thus market power. Credit institutions operating on a cross-border basis that do not
have experience in the market will face more difficulties in assessing the creditworthiness of
borrowers and in identifying ‘good’ and ‘bad’ borrowers than will national financial institutions.
Moreover, consumers with negative records who are unable to obtain credit in their home country
will be tempted to seek credit elsewhere.
Figures provided by the Belgium public registry (NBB) show that the number of consultations that
result in the appearance of a negative entry amounts to 6.3%, when the consumer involved is from
the same country as the credit institution (i.e. Belgian consumer, Belgian bank). It increases,
however, to 12-13% when the consumer is from a different country (Belgian bank, Dutch
consumer).
Asymmetry of information is in this sense a barrier to the development of cross-border lending
activities as retail lending remains highly concentrated and dominated by domestic banks. So far
financial institutions have limited their cross-border activities to wholesale banking. In a scenario
where there exists the exchange of information between credit bureaus and where financial
institutions have access to credit reports across the European Union, the individual with a negative
repayment history will be refused further credit, as would be the case in their home country. The
availability of information on the past behaviour of borrowers is therefore essential to the
development of a cross-border consumer credit market.
Obstacles to the development of a single credit reporting industry within EU countries are often
public-policy induced, namely, by the existence of regulations that prevent the exchange of cross-
border information. Italian banks, for example, are required to report any loans made by their
foreign branches to the Italian public credit registry, but not to the host country credit registry.
Similarly, Italian companies can borrow abroad without any report being filed with Italian
authorities. The integration of the capital market thus implies that public credit registries are losing
the capacity to provide full, accurate and reliable information on the overall credit situation (Japelli
and Pagano, 1999).
Indeed, it is clear that optimising the exchange of information will reduce the risk of default in
cross-border operations. The question therefore is how to construct the most adequate framework
for the exchange of information across Europe. Several alternatives appear feasible, including the
negotiation of bilateral agreements, the establishment of a pan-European network and the
harmonisation of regulation via a directive from the European Commission.
Adding a new piece of legislation might not be necessary, as the European directive on data
protection already establishes the basis for the cross-border exchange of information. The principle
of free movement requires that one should be able to move personal data freely between member
states, while safeguarding the right of the individual to privacy. Although the latter was not always
guaranteed under national laws, invoking the principle of subsidiarity has led to some disparities
within the EU since adoption of the EU directive.
                                                
15 For instance, in the case of the Netherlands cross-border lending amounts only to 5% of total lending to
individuals, 3.6% in Denmark and as little as 1.2% in France.CREDIT BUREAUS IN TODAY’S CREDIT MARKETS
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European credit bureaus are planning to establish cooperative agreements to provide lenders with
cross-border information. It is not possible to say when these agreements will become effective,
however, since differences in various data protection regulations covering the information
collected, as well as technical and organisational problems have not yet been resolved. It remains to
be seen which position the European Commission will adopt in the revision of the consumer credit
directive.
In addition, some national registries have signed bilateral cooperation agreements, as can be seen in
Belgium and the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany, Germany and Austria, and Germany and
Italy.
The development of a truly integrated retail credit market requires the establishment of an
integrated reporting system, where records are easily available to cross-border operations. Some
argue that the different privacy regimes represent ‘protectionist’ barriers. National regulators have
protected the status quo of information flows and data collection (Jentzsch, 2001). Moreover, legal
and institutional determinants of lending and defaults affect the comparison of data across
countries.
5. Conclusions
The exchange of a certain amount of information regarding the financial and payment history of
borrowers is necessary to the development and smooth functioning of financial markets. Scale
economies of gathering, processing and screening credit and non-credit information justify the
existence of credit bureaus. Recent technological improvements have reduced the cost of collecting
information and also the cost of sharing that information through credit bureaus. At the same time,
however, there is an obligation to preserve the right of the individual to privacy concerning his or
her financial transactions. A balance must therefore be found between the flow of private
information and the development of efficient markets. The present data protection directive only
provides for the harmonisation of minimum standards, and thus, further convergence of national
data protection laws is also desirable to ease market integration.
The importance of the availability and quality of information on the borrower’s credit history is
even more important for cross-border lending. Borrowers with a bad repayment history are tempted
to seek credit elsewhere. The improvement of cross-border exchange of information is therefore
essential for the development of a single retail credit market. In this area, there is a role for public
policy actors in removing any obstacles to the exchange of information, and ensuring that fears of
competition from domestic institutions do not hinder the development of cross-border lending.
Public and private credit bureaus can work independently or in a complementary fashion but the
obligation to consult public credit bureaus is likely to upset this balance. Public credit registries are
considered important for economic policy-makers, allowing them to have first hand information in
the evolution of credit and over-indebtedness in a country. Private credit bureaus may decide to
specialise in a particular sector or to offer credit-scoring services. Consequently, the creation of a
level playing field for the operation of both types of bureaus is crucial, and it should be left to the
market to decide on the preferred option.
Credit bureaus are key actors in the assessment of an individual’s ability to repay incurred debts
and can serve as valuable disciplinary instruments vis-à-vis borrowers. This should not, however,
lead to the conclusion that credit bureaus can provide perfect or quasi-perfect creditworthiness
assessments. It might be tempting to believe that the incidence of default in a scenario involving
positive credit bureaus is the result of irresponsible lending behaviour by credit institutions, and that
therefore the burden of dealing with over-indebtedness should be passed on to them. Evidence from
the US, however, where the percentage of accounts that are delinquent at any point in time is higher
than in most EU countries, demonstrates that the collection of comprehensive information by credit
bureaus does not ensure the ability to anticipate the occurrence of situations of over-indebtedness.AMPARO SAN JOSÉ RIESTRA
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The data on over-indebtedness in the EU are too sparse and heterogeneous to allow us to establish
any relationship between the level of over-indebtedness in a country and the type of credit bureaus
existing in a country, or to assess the relationship between indebtedness and over-indebtedness.
One should therefore be attentive to the qualitative aspects of over-indebtedness and the reasons
that cause it. Evidence from existing data shows that factors other than the accumulation of debt are
the main causes for excessive indebtedness. Also, the distribution of indebtedness – consumer,
mortgage or other credit – plays an important role. Over-indebtedness is closely linked to the socio-
economic context of households, such as unsteady employment, a death in the family or the break-
up of the family unit – factors that cannot be reflected in credit bureau data.
Consequently, the collection and maintenance of more comprehensive information on certain
expenditure patterns of households, such as the amount dedicated to rent, utilities or education, will
not necessarily eliminate the occurrence of over-indebtedness. On the other hand, the collection and
maintenance of adequate positive data will significantly increase technical, personnel and financial
requirements of credit bureaus, raising the cost for credit institutions, which will ultimately be
reflected in the cost of loans for consumers.
In terms of prevention of over-indebtedness, it is essential to provide education, information and
advice on credit conditions, the risks of excessive multiple debts and rational household budget
management. On the provider’s side, it is essential to guarantee that marketing practices are not
misleading and that contractual terms are clear. Consumer information, responsible lending
practices and the legal environment should be balanced in any public policy strategy.CREDIT BUREAUS IN TODAY’S CREDIT MARKETS
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Annex I. Definitions
Credit bureaus Organisations collecting, filing and distributing information, positive or
negative, on borrowers.
Credit report Information facilitated by the credit bureau to the potential lender on
the future borrower containing details on an individual’s debts,
following the request of credit by the individual.
Credit scoring Statistical programmes that establish the probability of repayment, or
risk, of granting a credit. The bank might refuse a credit if its score is
superior to the level of risk that the bank is willing to accept.
Default Failure to repay a credit.
Fresh start The characterisation of a debtor status, i.e. free of most debts. Giving
debtors a fresh start is one of the purposes of the US bankruptcy code.
Negative information Records consisting of delinquent borrowers, such as default payments,
chargeoffs or bankruptcies. Also called black information.
Positive information Records consisting of individuals with different outstanding type credit
that have not necessarily failed to repay. It often includes the amount of
the loan, the outstanding balance or revolving credit. Also called white
information.
Public registries Organisations established by central banks or supervisory authorities
that collect, file and distribute information on borrowers’ credit history.
Financial institutions’ reporting is compulsory.
Strategic default When a consumer can repay a credit but decides not to do so.32
Annex II. Data Protection Laws in the EU Member States
Country Legislation
Austria Federal law on data protection, 1978 amended 1986
Transposition directive 95/46/CE: Data protection act 2000
Belgium Privacy protection law, 1992
Transposition directive 95/46/CE: Law 1998
Arrête royal du 13 mars 2001 portant exécution de la loi du 1992 relative
à la protection des données personnelles
Loi du 10 août 2001 relative à la Centrale des Crédits
aux Particuliers
Denmark Transposition of directive: Act on the processing of personal data, law
429, 31 May 2000. The act substitutes ‘the public authorities’ registers
Act’ and ‘the private registers Act’
Finland Databases on personal information, 1987 amended 1995
Transposition directive 95/46/CE: law 523, 10 February 1999
France Law 78-17, 6 January 1978 on ‘Information technologies, databases and
liberties’
Transposition directive 95/46/CE: Proposed
Germany 21 January 1977 federal law covering the protection against the abusive
use of databases of personal data, modified by the protection of data law
of 20 December 1990 and amended on 14 September 1994
Transposition directive 95/46/CE: proposed
Greece Law 2472 on the protection of individuals regarding the use of privacy
information databases, 26 March 1997
Law 2472
Ireland Data protection law of 13 July 1988
Transposition directive 95/46/CE: proposed
Italy Law 675 of 31 December 1996, on the data protection, modified in 1997,
1998 and 1999
Transposition directive 95/46/CE: effectuated by the above law
Law 325 on security measures in the treatment of personal data, 3
November 2000
Netherlands Legislation on data protection, 28 December 1988, completed on 21
June 1990 by a law on police data
Transposition directive 95/46/CE: 6 June 2000
Luxembourg Legislation on the use of personal data in information techniques, law of
31 March 1979, amended 1992CREDIT BUREAUS IN TODAY’S CREDIT MARKETS
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Transposition directive 95/46/CE: Proposed
Portugal Law 10/91 on protection of data of personal character in the information
techniques, 29 April 1991, amended 1994
Transposition directive 95/46/CE: Law 67/98 26 October on data
protection
Spain Law on the treatment of personal data by electronic means, 29 October
1992
Transposition directive 95/46/CE: Law 15/99 personal data protection,
13 December 1999
Sweden Law on data protection, 11 May 1973
Transposition directive 95/46/CE: Law 204 on data protection, 24
October 1998
Credit Information Act
UK Law on data protection, 12 July 1988
Transposition directive 95/46/CE: Data protection law, 16 July 1998
Law on access to information, 30 November 200034
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